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TWO WAYS TO THINK ABOUT THE PUNISHMENT OF
CORPORATIONS

Albert W. Alschuler*
INTRODUCTION

This article compares the criminal punishment of corporations in the twentyfirst century with two ancient legal practices-deodand (the punishment of
animals and objects that have produced harm) and frankpledge (the punishment of
all members of a group when one member of the group has avoided apprehension
for a crime).1 It argues that corporate criminal punishment is a mistake but that
viewing it as frankpledge is less ridiculous than viewing it as deodand. The article
considers the implications of the choice between'these concepts for standards of
corporate guilt and for the sentencing of corporate offenders.
After a brief historical description of deodand and frankpledge, the article traces
the history of corporate criminal liability from William Blackstone through Arthur
Andersen. It emphasizes that this liability punishes the innocent, and it argues that
the punishment of innocent shareholders and employees should not be regarded as
"collateral" or "secondary."
The article notes that subjecting corporations and their officers to punishment
for the same crimes creates sharp conflicts of interest. It reviews the history of the
Justice Department's efforts to exploit these conflicts-initially by encouraging
corporate officers to deliver corporate guilty pleas to gain leniency for themselves
and more recently by pressing corporations to gather and deliver information about
their employees.
The article suggests that defenses of corporate criminal liability fall into two
categories. Arguments in the first category are expressive and match those that
once might have defended deodand. Arguments in the second category are
instrumental and match those that once might have supported frankpledge.
"Expressive retributivists" champion the deodand perspective. They blame
mindless legal entities for crimes committed by their employees. This article
considers the implications of their arguments.
Other defenders of corporate criminal liability view it as frankpledge-a device
for persuading everyone in an organization to monitor everyone else. This article
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University; Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Criminology, Emeritus, the
University of Chicago. I am grateful for the helpful comments of Linda Alschuler, Rachel Barkow, Richard
Epstein, James Jacobs, Morris Hoffman, and Stephen Presser. © 2009, Albert W. Alschuler.
1. I first offered this comparison 18 years ago at the end of a comment on two conference papers. See Albert W.
Alschuler, Ancient Law and the Punishmentof Corporations:Of Frankpledgeand Deodand, 71 B.U. L. Rav. 307,
312-13 (1991). Sara Sun Beale, Cheryl Evans, and the editors of the American CriminalLaw Review encouraged
me to revisit the comparison and, as they say in Congress, extend my remarks.
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questions the propriety of declaring some people guilty of other people's crimes
simply to encourage them to police one another. On the assumption that corporate
liability is here to stay, however, the article argues that it is better regarded as a
means to induce internal monitoring than as bona fide criminal punishment.
This article then considers the implications of the deodand and frankpledge
positions. Neither of these positions justifies the federal rule of respondeat
superior that authorizes the conviction of a corporation whenever an employee
acting within the scope of his employment has committed a crime. The champions
of both the deodand and frankpledge positions have in fact sought revision of this
rule.
Expressive retributivists propose replacing the rule with a "corporate ethos"
standard. The article argues, however, that this standard is incoherent and unworkable. The reform advocated by the frankpledge proponents is more sensible. If the
goal of corporate criminal liability is to induce appropriate monitoring, the
creation and maintenance of an appropriate corporate compliance program should
provide a defense to liability.
Proposals for such a defense have not fared well, and this article considers their
prospects. It suggests that, although the respondeat superior standard is truly
indefensible, it survives because it affords broad powers to prosecutors. The article
examines how prosecutors have used and misused their extraordinary powers.
A final section of this article considers the implications of the frankpledge
perspective for sentencing corporate offenders. A judge's goal in punishing a
corporation should be to induce a level of monitoring that will prevent more
criminallharm than the monitoring will cost.
I.DEODAND

The term deodand refers to the punishment of an animal or inanimate object that
has killed a person.2 The Book of Exodus endorsed the practice: "If an ox gore a
man or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh
shall not be eaten .... A standard reference is CriminalProsecutionand Capital
Punishmentof Animals by E. P. Evans, published in 1906. 4 As one alphabetically
minded reader of this work noted, it chronicled 191 actions against "asses, beetles,
bloodsuckers, bulls, caterpillars, cockchafers, cocks, cows, dogs, dolphins, eels,
field mice, flies, goats, grasshoppers, horses, locusts, mice, moles, rats, serpents,
sheep, slugs, snails, swine, termites, turtledoves, weevils, wolves, [and]

2. The word refers specifically to the English practice of forfeiting the offending animal or object to the Crown
and then using the proceeds for charitable purposes. The literal translation of deodand is "given to God." I use the
word more generically to encompass the official condemnation of animals and objects not only in England but in
other places.
3. Exodus 21:28 (King James).
4. E. P. EvANs, THE CRMNAL PROSECUITON AND CAPrrAL PUNISHmENT OF ANIMALS (Faber and Faber 1987)
(1906).
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worms ....

Under English law, any chattel found by a jury to have caused death was forfeit
to the Crown. 6 In the Case of the Lord of the Manor ofHampstead,7 "[a] cart met a
wagon loaded upon the road, and the cart endeavouring to pass by... overturned,
and threw the person that was in the cart just before the wheels of the waggon."8
The jury found that the cart, wagon, loadings, and horses were all deodands
because they had "moved [unto death].'9
Oliver Wendell Holmes devoted the first chapter of his legal classic The
Common Law to deodands.1 ° Among his many illustrations: When someone was
killed by a fall from a tree, "the rude Kukis of Southern Asia" required this
person's relatives to cut down the tree and scatter it in chips." Holmes argued that
primitive people attributed intentionality and blame to inanimate objects. Noting
that proceedings in admiralty were still brought against vessels and that everyone
called vessels "she," he observed, "If [following a ship accident] we should say to
an uneducated man to-day, 'She did it and she ought to pay for it,' it may be
doubted whether he would see the fallacy, or be ready to explain that the ship was
only property."' 12 In light of Holmes's view of the common man, it is easy to see
why someone called him the Yankee from Olympus. 13 And it is easy to
see why he
14
declared in this chapter that "[t]he life of the law has not been logic."'
II.

FRANKPLEDGE

Frankpledge was an English institution in which ten men were bound together
and held responsible for delivering anyone in any of their ten households who had

5. Walter Woodburn Hyde, The Prosecutionand Punishment of Animals and Lifeless Things in the Middle
Ages andModem imes, 64 U. PA. L. REv. 696, 708 (1916). Most prosecutions apparently involved pigs, for pigs
ran through European streets for centuries and "were frequently involved in altercations, particularly with small
children." Paul Schiff Berman, Rats, Pigs and Statues on Trial: The Creation of Cultural Narratives in the
Prosecution of Animals and Inanimate Objects, 69 N.YU. L. REv. 288, 298 (1994). See generally Louise
Harmon, The Day the Dogs Died: A Mad Essay on the PerilsofAlien Scholarship,or an Alien Essay on the Perils
of Mad Scholarship, 23 LEGAL STuD. F 1, 14 (1999); Anna Pervukhin, All the Lizards Stand and Say "Yes, Yes,
Yes": The Element of Play in Legal Actions against Animals and Inanimate Objects (Bepress Legal Series

Working Paper No. 96, 2003), http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/96.
6. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF
EDWARD I 472-73 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1968) (1898) ("Horses, oxen, carts, boats, mill-wheels and
cauldrons were the commonest of deodands. In English men called the deodand the bane, that is, the slayer.").
7. Case of the Lord of the Manor of Hampstead, (1704) 91 Eng. Rep. 195, 195 (K.B.).
8. Id.
9. Id.at 195-96 (adding that "if a tree shall fall upon the branch of another tree, and both fall to the ground, and
the branch kills a man, the tree and branch are both forfeited") (emphasis omitted).
10. OLWVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1-38 (Dover 1991) (1881).

11. Id. at 19.
12. Id. at 28-29; see POLLOCK & MArriLAND, supra note 6, at 474 ("[lIt is hard for us to acquit ancient law of
that unreasoning instinct that impels the civilised man to kick, or consign to eternal perdition, the chair over which
he has stumbled.").
13. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS: JUsTIcE HOLMES AND His FAMILY (1945).
14. HOLMES, supranote 10, at 1.
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committed a crime. If the criminal escaped, all ten members of the tithing were
fined. 15 A precursor of this practice was in existence at least by the time of King
Edgar the Peaceful, 6 who died in 975 and whose mistress was named Wulfthryth.t 7
A law of Edgar's reign required every man to have a borh (or surety), and it said,
"[I]f any one then do wrong and run away, let the borh bear that which he ought to
bear." 1 8 The Normans translated the Anglo-Saxon wordfrithborh as frankpledge
and used the institution effectively. '9 There were no professional police forces, but
frankpledge gave everyone the job of capturing wrongdoers. When the members of
a tithing allowed a criminal to escape, they were punished collectively for this
default. F. W. Maitland speculated that frankpledge led to the jury of presentment
or grand jury.2" Even after the members of a community were freed of the
obligation to capture wrongdoers, they were required to tell the sheriffs and
justices what they knew.
Ill. THE COMMON

LAW VIEW OF CORPORATE CRIME

Frankpledge vanished long before Blackstone wrote his Commentaries in the
eighteenth century, E" but deodand persisted. It was abolished in England only in
1846.22 Yet Blackstone viewed this practice as hopelessly primitive. He attributed

15. 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 13 (3d ed. 1922) (1903); see also POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 568-71 (noting variations on the frankpledge system described in text). The definitive
work is WILLAM ALFRED MORRIS, THE FRANKPLEEI

SYSTEM (1910).

16. See Frankpledge,11 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 34 (Hugh Chisholm ed., 11th ed. 1910).
17. See Edgar, 8 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 933 (Hugh Chisholm ed., 11th ed. 1910). Edgar was the
father of Ethelred the Unready, whom John Cleese portrayed in Monte Python films. See id.; John Cleese
Filmography,MoviE PLANETS, http:l/movieplanets.comlimdbphp/imdb-person.php?mid=0000092.
18. Frankpledge,supra note 16; see MORRIS, supra note 15, at 19 (describing this law as "the last step in the
establishment of general peace suretyship").
19. Frankpledge,supra note 16, at 34; see MORRIS, supra note 15, at 31 (The "name seems to be nothing but a
Norman version of the word used in the everyday speech of the English people."). But see id. at 2 (suggesting that
"franc pledge" was a translation of the Latin term "plegium liberale"). Morris offers evidence that the Normans
organized the frankpledge system during the reign of William the Conqueror and that frankpledge differed
significantly from its Anglo-Saxon predecessors. See id. at 8-41. Notably, although earlier systems required every
man to find a surety, they did not force anyone to become one. In the earlier systems, principals and sureties
apparently struck their own bargains.
20. See F. W. Maitland, Introduction to 2 SELECr PLEAS INMANORIAL AND OTHER SEIGNORIAL COUicrs xi,
xxxvi-xxxvii (F. W. Maitland ed., Professional Books, Ltd. 1974) (1889); see also ALBERT BEEBE WHrm, THE
MAKING OF THE ENGLISH CoNsTrrrnoN 175, 181 (2d ed., rev. 1925).
21. See Frankpledge,supra note 16, at 35 (declaring that, although frankpledge was in "active operation" in
1376, it soon began to fall into disuse and vanished altogether during the Tudor period).
22. See Deodands Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 62 (Eng.). In the years just preceding 1846, coroners seeking to
compensate the families of workers killed in industrial accidents had resurrected the use of deodands. See Harry
Smith, From Deodand to Dependency, 11 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 389 (1967). Deodand's close cousin, the in rem
forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime, persists in America today. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442
(1996) (upholding the forfeiture of a wife's interest in ajointly owned automobile after her husband had sex with a
prostitute in the vehicle). Indeed, revenue-hungry American legislatures have expanded instrumentality forfeiture
far beyond its common law boundaries by requiring the forfeiture of real estate as well as personal property. See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b)(1) (2006).
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23
it to superstition and claimed that it had arisen "in the blirid days of popery.
For Blackstone, criminal guilt was personal. He wrote, "Punishments
are ... only inflicted for that abuse of that free will, which God has given to a
man."' 24 In accordance with this view, Blackstone declared that "[a] corporation
cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime.",25 He regarded the point as so
obvious that it needed no elaboration.

IV. THE CURRENT AMERICAN Vmw
A. Bye, Bye Blackstone: New York Central and Its Progeny
The year 2009 marks the centennial of a giant step backwards. In 1909, in New
26
York Central & Hudson River RailroadCompany v. United States, the Supreme
27 and the power of the corporaCourt muttered something about "public policy
tion in "modern times."28 It then upheld a federal statute that punished corporations criminally for charging their customers too little-for undercutting government-fixed prices. 29 The Court not only recognized Congress's power to punish
corporations (an appropriate mark of judicial restraint) but also praised Congress's
the common law rule articulated by Blackstone an
exercise of this power. It called
"old and exploded doctrine."' 30
New York Centralupheld a statute that expressly punished corporations. It did
not suggest that statutes silent on the subject should be read to authorize the
prosecution of these entities. The Court wrote in fact, "[T]here are some crimes[]
31
which in their nature cannot be committed by corporations,,' but no one had any
idea what crimes the Court had in mind. After the decision in New York Central,
the Supreme Court and other courts generally read criminal statutes to impose
corporate criminal liability even in the absence of any indication that Congress or a
state legislature favored this outcome.3 2

23. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *300.
24. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *27.

25. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *476; see also Anonymous Case (No. 935), (1706) 88 Eng. Rep. 1518,
1518 (K.B.) ("A corporation is not indictable but the particular members of it are.").
26. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
27. Id. at 494-95.
28. Id. at 495.
- 29. Id.
30. Id. at 496. State courts had begun to allow the prosecution of corporations in the mid-nineteenth century,
and although "the early prosecutions were for crimes involving a corporation's failure to act, ... the distinction
between offenses involving nonfeasance and misfeasance was short-lived." Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of
Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporationsin
CriminalProsecutions,63 l'tmN. L. Ray. 793, 808-09 n.61 (1996). Several federal district courts had approved the
criminal punishment of corporations in the years just preceding New York Central.Id. at 810-12.
31. New York Central,212 U.S. at 494.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1909); Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United
States, 213 F. 926, 936 (8th Cir. 1914) ('The whole growth of the modern law tends to subject corporations, as
nearly as may be, to the same pains and penalties imposed upon individuals."); London v. Everett H. Dunbar
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The statute upheld in New York Central authorized corporate punishment
whenever an "agent or other person acting for or employed by [the corporation]
acting within the scope of his employment" violated the statute's prohibitions.33
The Supreme Court did not consider whether the same rule of respondeatsuperior
would apply when statutes were silent on the subject. Without much reflection,
however, later decisions applied the respondeat superior principle of New York
Centralwhenever corporations were prosecuted.3 4
Many states have approved a less sweeping standard of liability. Following the
lead of the Model Penal Code, they ordinarily limit a corporation's responsibility
to cases in which "the commission of the offense was authorized, requested,
commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a
high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his
office or employment., 35 In the federal courts and other states, however, a criminal
act by any employee performing his customary duties and intended in part to
benefit the corporation is sufficient. It is immaterial that the employee was
specifically directed not to perform the act 36 or that the corporation was among this
37
employee's victims.

Under the rule of respondeat superior,a single errant employee can cause the
downfall of a multi-national corporation and the loss of thousands of jobs.38

Corp., 179 F 506, 510 (1st Cir. 1910); People v. Canadian FurTrappers' Corp., 161 N.E. 455,455-56 (N.Y. 1928);
People v. Star Co., 120 N.YS. 498, 500 (NA. App. Div. 1909); State v. Ice & Fuel Co., 81 S.E. 737, 738 (N.C.
1914); Vulcan Last Co. v. State, 217 N.W. 412,414-15 (Wis. 1928).
33. The Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 57-103, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903) (current version codified in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.).
34. See, e.g., Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir. 1945) ("The generally accepted
rule is thus laid down: 'A corporation may be held criminally responsible for acts committed by its agents,
provided such acts were committed within the scope of the agents' authority or course of their employment."')
(quoting current 19 C.J.S., Corporations § 1362 (2008), formerly § 861); Zito v. United States, 64 F2d 772, 775
(7th Cir. 1933) ("Corporations speak and act through their agents. There is abundant proof in the instant case that
one McNamara was an agent of the appellant company and that he had authority to sell its products. Therefore, it
naturally follows that his actions... are binding upon appellant company.").
35. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). At least twelve states have approved the
Model Penal Code formulation without significant modification, and a comparable number have approved
standards based on the Code.that expand, modify, or clarify its ill-defined reference to "[h]igh managerial" agents.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 cmt. 5(c) n.37 (1985). For example, the New York statute defines "high
managerial agent" as any "officer of a corporation or any other agent in a position of comparable authority with
respect to the formulation of corporate policy or the supervision in a managerial capacity of subordinate
employees." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.20(l)(b) (McKinney 2009). See generally Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting
CorporationsRevisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen Prosecution,43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107 app. B (2006)
(reviewing the law of each state).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
467 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 138 F.3d 961, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1997), aff'd,
526 U.S. 398 (1999); United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Automated
Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985).
38. Sara Sun Beale writes, "It is ...true that liability can be imposed on corporations for the actions of
corporate employees, even in the absence of specific proof of corporate fault. This is not unique." Sara Sun Beale,
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39
Prosecutorial discretion and most corporate managers' terror of a criminal trial
keep the collapse from happening often, but the case of Arthur Andersen, LLP is a
notorious example. In Andersen, the trial judge instructed the jury that its members
need not agree about which corporate employee committed the crime.'' Some
courts in fact have invited the conviction of a corporation even when none of its
employees was a criminal. These courts have envisioned the corporation as a
Colossus aware of everything that any of its employees know, and they have
declared that the "collective knowledge" of this imaginary giant can make the
4
absence of mens rea on the part of any sentient being immaterial. '
Although the jurors in the Arthur Andersen case were not required to reach
42
agreement about which of the firm's 85,000 employees committed a crime, they
returned a special verdict reporting that they did agree; the criminal was an
in-house lawyer, Nancy Temple.4 3 One juror complained that the judge's instructions had "stacked the deck" in favor of the prosecution. "They just forced us to
come back with a guilty verdict," said juror Wanda McKay. "One person did one
thing and tore the whole company down." 44 Yet even after Arthur Andersen's
conviction, the government never charged Nancy Temple with a crime. The
45
Supreme Court's ultimate reversal of Andersen's conviction did not save the

Is CorporateCriminalLiability Unique?, 44 A. CRIM. L. REv. 1503, 1505 (2007). She notes two other instances
of vicarious criminal liability in the American criminal justice system (but only two):
[I]n some jurisdictions felony murder imposes liability for one of the most serious offenses on the
basis of vicarious strict liability. Similarly, in many jurisdictions an accomplice to one crime is also
responsible for other crimes committed as a natural and probable consequence of the offense he
aided and abetted, even if he does not assist or even know of the additional offenses.... Compared
to liability for homicide, corporate criminal liability for white collar offenses does not seem like
such a big deal.
Id. at 1514-15. Analogizing corporate criminal liability to felony-murder rule and to the natural-and-probableconsequences doctrine does not say anything nice about it. Unlike corporate criminal liability, however, the
felony-murder rule and the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine do not punish the blameless; they simply
hold deliberate wrongdoers responsible for more than they intended. Corporate criminal liability does appear to
be unique.
39. Dale Osterle comments, "Since an indicted firm is a dead firm, a decision to defend an indictment is
suicide." Dale A. Osterle, Early Observations on the Prosecutions of the Business Scandals of 2002-03: On
Sideshow Prosecutions,Spitzer's Clash with DonaldsonOver Turf the Choice of Civil or Criminal Actions, and
the Tough Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1 OtHO ST. J. CRIM. L. 443, 476 (2004).
40. ArthurAndersen Convicted of Obstructionof Justice-Firm to Cease Auditing Public Companies, FAcrs
ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, June 15, 2002, at 456G1, availableat LEXIS.

41. See, e.g., United States v. Bank ofNew England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844,854-56 (1stCir. 1987); United States
v. Sci. Apps. Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 2d 40, 55-56 (D.D.C. 2008); United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F.
Supp. 730, 738-39 (W.D. Va. 1974); State v. Zeta Chi Fraternity, 696 A.2d 530, 535-37 (N.H. 1997).
42. See Ken Brown & Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Arthur Andersen's Fallfrom Grace is a Sad Tale of Greed and
Miscues, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2002, at Al (reporting that Arthur Andersen employed 85,000 people worldwide).
43. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 486 (2006);
ArthurAndersen Convicted, supranote 40.
44. Arthur Andersen Convicted, supranote 40.
45. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005).
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85,000 jobs.4 6
When the courts convict corporations of crimes, they do it without affording
them the full protection of the Bill of Rights. 47 For ever-shifting reasons, all of
them bad, the Supreme Court has held the privilege against self-incrimination
inapplicable to corporations.4 8 Corporate defendants must produce incriminating
documents even when the act of producing these documents would tend to

46. See Brown & Dugan, supranote 42. Although the government did not charge Nancy Temple, it did charge
and enter a plea agreement with another Andersen employee, David Duncan. After the Supreme Court reversed
Andersen's conviction, Duncan was permitted to withdraw his plea. Greg Farrell, FormerAuditor Isn't Done with
Enron, USA TODAY, Nov. 25, 2005, at 7B. The Ford Pinto prosecution, in which a jury acquitted Ford Motor
Company of manslaughter, was another case in which prosecutors filed charges against a corporation while
declining to charge the individuals alleged to have committed its crime. See BRENT FiSSE & JOHN BRArrwArrE,
THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CoRRATE OFFENDERs 45 (1983). Prosecutors did charge the individuals allegedly
responsible for the crimes of the Bankers Trust Corporation, but after the corporation entered a plea agreement
and paid a fine of $60 million, a jury acquitted these individuals of all of the twenty-seven charges brought against
them. See Matthew L. Schwartz, Using the CriminalLaw to CombatInsider Banking Misconduct, 35 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 371, 371-73 (2002).
47. See Oklahoma Press Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 205 (1946) ("[C]orporations are not entitled to all of the
constitutional protections which private individuals have in these and related matters."). See generally Henning,
supra note 30.
48. The Court first held the privilege inapplicable to corporations in Hale v. Henkel. 201 U.S. 43 (1906). It
declared that a corporation was a "creature of the State" with "certain special privileges and franchises" and that
"[t]here is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its
powers." Id. at 74-75. A later Supreme Court decision spoke of "[tlhe [state's] reserved power of visitation" and
said that "the visitatorial power.., of necessity reaches the corporate books." Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361, 384-85 (1911).
An enterprise no more waives the privilege against self-incrimination by accepting a corporate charter,
however, than it waives any other constitutional right. Could the state force an entity that obtained a charter to
waive the right to jury trial? Or to stand trial without counsel? Do the state's "visitatorial powers" entitle the police
to break down doors and seize corporate records without search warrants and without probable cause? Hale itself
reiterated an earlier ruling that a corporation retains some Fourth Amendment rights. 201 U.S. at 76-77
(discussing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)). Moreover, the claim of a reserved "visitatorial power" as
a reason for denying the Fifth Amendment privilege collapsed when the Supreme Court held that unincorporated
"collective entities" could not claim the privilege either. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944).
The Court offered a second rationale for withdrawing the privilege in White. It declared that "[tihe
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying only to natural
individuals." Id. at 698. It added that the privilege should not extend to any organization with "a character so
impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely
private or personal interests of its constituents." Id. at 701. The Court argued that corporate records "embody no
element of personal privacy." Id. at 700.
Following a grant of immunity from prosecution, however, the government may force an individual to disclose
his most intimate secrets without violating the privilege. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 441
(1972). As the Supreme Court now has recognized, "the Fifth Amendment protects against 'compelled
self-incrimination, not [the disclosure of] private information."' Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,401 (1976)
(quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 n.7 (1975)). Because the Fifth Amendment privilege
advances purposes other than the protection of personal privacy, the fact that corporate records "embody no
element of personal privacy" supplies no reason for withholding the privilege.
White added a third rationale for withdrawing the privilege. It appears to be the only one still standing:
The scope and nature of the economic activities of incorporated and unincorporated organizations ... demand that the constitutional power of the federal and state governments to regulate
those activities be correspondingly effective .... Were the cloak of the privilege to be thrown
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incriminate them. Moreover, to ensure that corporations will not benefit from the
privilege, the Supreme Court requires corporate officers to produce these records
49
even when the act of production would incriminate them personally. The
exception to the privilege for corporations swallows the rule applicable to
individuals, and the tail wags the dog.50
B. Punishingthe Innocent
5
Of course criminal punishment cannot really be borne by a fictional entity. As
Baron Thurlow, a Lord Chancellor of England, put it sometime before 1792, a
52
corporation has "no soul to damn, no body to kick.", This punishment is inflicted
instead on human beings whose guilt remains unproven. Innocent shareholders
pay the fines, and innocent employees, creditors, customers, and communities
sometimes feel the pinch too. The embarrassment 53of corporate criminal liability is
that it punishes the innocent along with the guilty.

around these impersonal records and documents, effective enforcement of many federal and state
laws would be impossible ....
White, 322 U.S. at 700. More recently, Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988), declared that "recognizing a
Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of the records custodians of collective entities would have a detrimental
impact on the Government's efforts to prosecute 'white-collar crime,' one of the most serious problems
confronting law enforcement authorities." Id. at 115.
The government, however, has no greater interest in enforcing the laws against white-collar crime than in
enforcing the laws against murder, rape, and robbery. The framers of the Constitution sacrificed the most effective
enforcement of these criminal prohibitions when they established the privilege, and there is no reason to imagine
that they meant a different rule to apply to the government's investigations of crimes like price fixing and bribing
foreign officials. By punishing corporations without affording them the protections of the Bill of Rights, the
government has its cake and eats it too.
49. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 113-14 (1988).
50. The Court's distinction between corporations and individuals initially meant a great deal more than it does
today. Unlike corporations, individuals once were permitted to withhold documents whose contents would tend to
incriminate them. Today both corporations and individuals can usually be required to produce incriminating
documents. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 605 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,401 (1976).
51. The Supreme Court has called the corporation "a mere creature of the law, invisible, intangible, and
incorporeal." Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 88 (1809); see also Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636(1819) (calling the corporation "an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law").
52. John Coffee recycled Thurlow's remark as the title of a noted article. See John C. Coffee, "No Soul to
Damn, No Body to Kick": An UnscandalizedInquiry Into the Problem'ofCorporatePunishment, 79 MICH. L.
REv. 386, 386 (1981). With one brief interruption, Thurlow was Lord Chancellor from 1778 until 1792. He
presumably made his statement before leaving that position. See Alexander Wood Renton, Edward Thurlow
Thurlow, 26 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 903-04 (Hugh Chisholm, ed., 11th ed. 1910). Many scholars have
quoted Thurlow, but no one has tracked his statement to a primary source. Coffee noted its quotation in MERvYN
KING, PUBLIc POLICY AND a CORPORATION 1 (1977).
53. The late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century penology that gave rise to corporate criminal responsibility rejected the concept-of blame altogether. Roscoe Pound voiced the views of most serious thinkers about crime
in the Age of Darwin when he spoke of the legal system's "exaggerated respect for the individual," declared that
behavioral science had "routed" the concept of free will, and wrote, "We recognize that in order to deal with crime
in an intelligent and practical manner we must give up the retributive theory." Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing
Purposes of Criminal Punishment:A Retrospective on the Last Century and Some ThoughtsAbout the Next, 70 U.
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The Justice Department's Manual for United States Attorneys responds to this
embarrassment with a shrug: "Virtually every conviction of a corporation, like
virtually every conviction of an individual, will have an impact on innocent third
parties."54 The Manual discusses the unjustified pain caused by the punishment of
corporations under the heading "Collateral Consequence," listing it as one of many
things a prosecutor "may consider" in deciding whether to file charges and enter
deferred prosecution agreements. 5 Sara Sun Beale observes:
In the case of corporate sanctions, employees may lose their jobs and their
retirement security, and investors may be hard hit.... Are these secondary
effects distinctive? Unfortunately, they are not. The secondary impacts of
federal drug policies dwarf the effect of policies regarding corporate and white
collar offenses.56
Beale then describes how the mass incarceration of drug offenders has devastated
families and neighborhoods.57
The analogy is flawed. When an offender with children is sent to prison, his
children may suffer, yet criminal justice officials may have no way to punish the

CHi. L. REv. 1, 4 (2003) (citations omitted). Pound and his contemporaries maintained that the criminal law and
all law should be entirely forward-looking and instrumental.
Although the Supreme Court's opinion in New York Central did not discuss penology, a noted 1927 article on
the criminal punishment of corporations did. See Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36
YALE L.J. 827 (1927). This article, which Henry Edgerton wrote ten years before his appointment to the D.C.
Circuit, declared, "[T]he assumption that crime involves 'guilt' is quite erroneous." Id. at 842. Edgerton saw no
significant difference between crimes and torts., id. at 836, and he apparently viewed the retributivist position as a
form of sadism:
The argument against corporate criminal responsibility, that the corporation cannot itself be
"guilty" and therefore should not be punished, rests on the tacit assumption that the aim
of criminal
law is retributive... consists, in other words, in the pleasure which some persons derive from the
infliction of pain upon those whom they conceive 'to deserve it.
Id. at 832. Edgerton announced,
The chief civilized purpose of criminal law is deterrence-the prevention of acts which are
conceived to injure one social interest or another. The question is not whose mind is "guilty," but
whose responsibility will serve this deterrent purpose .... It seems evident that this purpose is
further served if corporate criminal responsibility is added to the criminal responsibility of the
corporation's representatives.
Id. at 833. He added, "Corporate criminal responsibility tends to prevent crime not only by influencing the
corporation's representatives of all degrees to abstain from conducting its business in unlawful ways, but also by
influencing those of higher or remote degree to restrain subordinates." Id. at 835.
54. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATroPNEys' MAmuAL § 9-28.1000 (2008).
55. Id.; see also id. at § 9-28.300 (listing as one of nine factors a prosecutor "should" consider "collateral
consequences, including whether there is disproportionate harm to shareholders, pension holders, employees, and
others not proven personally culpable").
56. Beale, supra note 38, at 1522.
57. Id. at 1522-23 (quoting Tracey L. Meares, Social Organizationand Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRim.
L. REv. 191, 206-07 (1998)).
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offender appropriately without hurting other people.5 The human perpetrators of
the crimes now attributed to corporations, however, can be convicted and incarcerated without punishing innocent shareholders and employees as well. Undeserved
suffering that can be avoided should be avoided. 9
The penalties imposed on innocent shareholders and employees when corporations are convicted are not incidental, collateral, or secondary. They are what the
punishment of a collective entity is all about. The description of these penalties as
collateral simply illustrates the persistent power of mystical deodand thinking.
Professor Beale and the authors of the U.S. Attorneys' Manual apparently classify
the punishment of the corporate entity as primary and the punishment of the human
beings inside it as secondary. In their view, the entity can be evil although the
people who comprise it are mostly good. Unlike Baron Thurlow, they imagine that
ethos but a soul. The devils inside it must be exorcised
the entity has not only an
60
despite the human cost.

58. Courts, sentencing commissions, and legislatures should do much more than they currently do to minimize
the secondary effects of criminal punishment. See generally Darryl K. Brown, Third Party Interests in Criminal
Law, 80 TEx. L. REy. 1383 (2002).
59. Defenders of corporate criminal liability note that it may be impossible to determine which corporate
employees committed a crime, especially when all of them point fingers at one another. See, e.g., Edgerton, supra
note 54, at 834. Imagine, however, that Mom or Dad or both of them have killed their only child. Mom denies her
guilt and accuses Dad; Dad denies his guilt and accuses Mom. No physical or other evidence reveals which parent
is telling the truth, if either of them is. The prosecutor concludes that neither Mom nor Dad can be proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Is the appropriate solution to convict the "marital entity"? Or the "family"?
60. Professor Beale writes:
[T]he argument that it is improper to impose criminal fines that effectively "punish" the "innocent"
shareholders, employees, creditors, and others, proves far too much. These arguments apply
equally to punitive damages, and indeed to any money judgment against a corporation, since such
ajudgment also reduces the shareholders' equity (as well as its ability to pay its' employees and
creditors).
Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRim.L. REV. 1481, 1485
(2009).
Of course a widget-manufacturing company should pay for the steel it has purchased, and a court should force it
to pay if it refuses to honor its contract. Equally, this company should pay for the injuries its employees inflict in
the course of their employment. These injuries are as much a cost of widget-production as the cost of steel, and
this cost should be reflected in the price of widgets. Forcing the corporation to pay even "punitive" damages may
be appropriate when wrongdoing is difficult to detect or when injuries are small enough that victims have little
incentive to sue. Although called punitive, these damages may do no more than require the corporation to
"internalize" some costs it has inflicted on people not before the court. See BMW of North America v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 582 (1996). Forcing the company's innocent shareholders to pay the cost of producing widgets before
they pocket the profits is obviously appropriate. Punishing them when they have done nothing wrong is--equally
obviously-inappropriate.
Beale asks, "Do criminal penalties really differ in some fundamental way from other damages that are properly
imposed upon corporations?" Beale, supra,at 1485. The answer is yes. The law distinguishes between civil and
criminal proceedings for a reason. Sadly, Professor Beale and many others have missed it.
Not only is the criminal punishment of corporations unjustified in principle; it is probably less effective in
practice than civil regulation. Civil regulation removes the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
permits the imposition of sanctions by administrative agencies rather than courts. See, e.g., V. S. Khanna,
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1477 (1996) (offering an
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C. ManufacturingLeverage
Subjecting real wrongdoers and the fictional entities that employ them to
prosecution for the same crimes leads to sharp conflicts of interest. Corporate
officers fearful of prosecution may offer the corporation's guilty plea and its
payment of a substantial fine to avoid the risk of jail themselves. The Justice
Department once was receptive to these bargains, 6 but it now presses hard in the
opposite direction. Following the policy expressed in the 2003 Thompson Memorandum 62 as modified by the McNulty Memorandum in 200663 and then by later
revisions, 64 it offers to let corporations off the hook in exchange for their
assistance in prosecuting their officers and employees. Since 2003, the Department
has entered at least 103 deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements
(DPAs and NPAs) in which corporations have avoided prosecution by waiving

extended argument that civil sanctions deter corporate wrongdoing more effectively than criminal sanctions);
Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Crime and Its Control, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DI-IcONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW 492-97 (Peter Newman, ed., 1998) (maintaining that lower procedural hurdles and sanctioning costs make
civil penalties more cost-effective deterrents of corporate wrongdoing than criminal punishment). The Supreme
Court currently affords legislatures broad leeway to declare sanctions civil rather than criminal. Criminal
safeguards are required only when the "clearest proof' establishes that a sanction is "so punitive either in purpose
or effect... as to 'transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty."' Hudson v.
United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1997) (quoting Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956))
(overruling the more restrictive standard of United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989)).
Of course nothing in this article opposes the regulation and taxation of corporations or the use of civil sanctions
to enforce the legal obligations of these entities.
On the European continent, corporations usually are not subject to criminal prosecution, but recent years have
seen substantial slippage in the American direction. See generally Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What
Developments in Western Europe Tell Us About American Critiques of CorporateCriminal Liability, 8 BUFF.
CitM. L. REV. 89 (2004).
61. I recall being offended by several such bargains when I worked in the Justice Department's Criminal
Division in 1968-69, and the Department's policy was apparently no different in 1985. In the spring of that year,
[defense attorney Tom] Cumin told [E. R] Hutton's board that it faced two choices: plead guilty to
a massive list of felonies or face a trial that would likely see three senior Hutton executives
convicted and drive Hutton out of business. Cumin advised settling with the government .... On
May 2, Hutton agreed to plead guilty to 2,000 counts of mail and wire fraud, as well as pay a $2
million fine plus $750,000 for the cost of the investigation. Hutton also agreed to pay $8 million in
restitution .... In return, Cumin wrung two major concessions [one of which was that] no Hutton
executives would be prosecuted ....
Wikipedia, E.F. Hutton & Co., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E_F_Hutton (last visited September 30, 2009); see
also JESSE KoRNBLuTH, HIGHLY CoNFmENT: THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF MICHAEL MILKEN 136 (1992);

Nathaniel C. Nash, E.F Hutton Guilty in Bank Fraud:PenaltiesCould Top $10 Million, N.Y TaMEs, May 3, 1985,
atAl.
62. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Dep't
Components & U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/daglcftfl
corporateguidelines.htm. [hereinafter Thompson Memo].
63. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Dep't
Components & U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dagl
speeches /2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf. [hereinafter McNulty Memo].
64. The Department's current Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations are contained in the
U.S. Attorneys' Manual. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 54, at §§ 9-28.000 to 9-28.1300.
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their legal rights and agreeing informally to the imposition of sanctions. 65 Many
agreements have required the corporations to assist the government in convicting
their officers.
The Thompson memorandum authorized prosecutors to consider adversely both
a corporation's failure to waive the attorney-client privilege and its advancement
of legal fees to officers under investigation.66 The McNulty memorandum,
however, softened the Thompson memorandum's language concerning waivers of
the attorney-client privilege. 67 These waivers became far less frequent in postMcNulty DPAs and NPAs. 68 Moreover, in 2006, a federal district court held that
the Department of Justice violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel by
pressing a corporate employer not to pay its officers' legal fees. 69 Deferring to this
decision, the McNulty memorandum declared that, in evaluating cooperation,
"[p]rosecutors generally should not take into account whether a corporation is
advancing or reimbursing attorneys' fees.",70 The Second Circuit later upheld the
district court's decision.71
The McNulty memorandum noted that it was responding to concerns expressed
by "[m]any ... associated with the corporate legal community., 72 Thanks largely
to the lawyers' lobby,73 the Department now allows corporations to pay the legal
fees of their accused employees. Nevertheless, the Department may still demand
74
as a condition of its favor that corporations investigate these employees and
7
5
discipline or fire them. What corporate investigators learn, moreover, must be
65. See Lawrence D. Finder, Ryan D. McConnell, & Scott L. Mitchell, Betting the Corporation:Compliance
or Defiance? Corporate Pre-Trial Agreement Update 2008 at 11, available at http:lpapers.ssm.comlsol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid= 1332033. Cases in which the government lets corporations off the hook altogether in
return for their assistance may not result in DPAs and NPAs.

66. Thompson Memo, supra note 62, at 5.
67. McNulty Memo, supra note 63, at 8-11.
68. See Finder et al., supra note 65, at 11. Even agreements that do not require explicit waivers of the privilege

may require cooperation that a corporation cannot give unless its lawyers reveal information obtained in
confidence.
69. United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008).
The district court later excluded the statements of two corporate officers because, in response to government
pressure, the corporation had threatened these officers with a loss of their jobs and of corporate payment of their
legal fees unless they gave the statements. United States v. Stein (Stein 11), 440 F Supp. 2d 315, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y.

2006).
70. McNulty Memo, supra note 63, at 11; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 55, at § 9-28.730.
71. United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008).

72. McNulty Memo, supra note 63, on the first of two pages preceding page 1.
73. See Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial
Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 53, 83-84 (2007) (noting that the Chamber of

Commerce, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, former
Attorney General Edwin Meese, and former Acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger 1I had all denounced the
Thompson Memorandum).
74. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 54, at § 9-28.800 (describing the requisites of corporate compliance
programs).
75. See id. at § 9-28.900 ("Among the factors prosecutors should consider and weigh are whether the
corporation appropriately disciplined wrongdoers ... ").
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delivered to the government. 76 A later section of this article will consider other
features of the Justice Department's DPAs and NPAs, including their provisions
for compliance programs and the appointment of corporate monitors." For now, it
is enough to note that corporate criminal liability creates acute conflicts of interest
for corporate managers while affording enormous bargaining power to the government.78
V. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF CoRPoRATE CRIMINAL LIAILITY

Misguided though it is, corporate criminal liability is probably here to stay.
Much to my regret, we cannot return to the eighteenth century. The question in the
twenty-first century is how best to conceptualize this practice. There are two
alternatives, which we can call deodand and frankpledge.
A. The Corporationas Deodand
People indignant about an injury produced by a corporation's employees may
treat the corporation as deodand. They may truly personify and hate the corporation. They may hate the mahogany paneling, the Lear jet, the smokestack, the glass
tower, and all of the people inside. They-the mahogany and all of them-are
responsible for the medical fraud, the oil spill, the price fixing, and the illegal
campaign contributions. To superstitious people, villains need not breathe. They
may include Exxon, Warner Lambert, and the cable company.
Scholars have advanced refined variations of the deodand position. Dan Kahan
declares, "Punishing corporations... is understood to be the right way for society
to repudiate the false valuations that their crimes express. Criminal liability 'sends
the message' that people matter more than profits. '7 9 Endorsing a similar "expressive retributivist" position, Peter Henning observes, "The label 'criminal' has
social significance aside from the particular punishment imposed on the of-

76. See id. at § 9-28.700 ("Mhe prosecutor may consider... the corporation's willingness to provide relevant
information and evidence and identify relevant actors within and outside the organization, including senior
executives."); id. at § 9-28.720 ("Whichever process the corporation selects [for gathering information], the
government's key measure of cooperation must remain the same as it does for an individual: has the party timely
disclosed the relevant facts about the putative misconduct?").
77. See infra text accompanying notes 130-54.
78. A former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department's Criminal Division and his
co-author write that "in most cases-especially those resolved since the Thompson Memorandum was issuedcooperatiog is perhaps the most important factor in a prosecutor's assessment of whether to bring criminal charges
against the company itself." Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a
Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memorandum in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRm. L. REv. 1095, 1135
(2006). See also Andrew Weissman, A New Approach to CorporateCriminalLiability, 44 A. CRIM. L. REv.
1319, 1321 (2007) ("It is now a commonplace position among the white collar bar post-Enron-among both
defense and prosecution--that corporate defense consists largely of being an arm of the prosecutor.").
79. Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 618-19
(1998).
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fender." 80
The punishment of corporations can indeed be expressive, and so can the
punishment of other things. I myself have repudiated false valuations by punishing
my computer. When a family member or colleague has discovered my discipline of
the machine, however, I have usually been embarrassed. Expressing one's values
by smashing a computer can be therapeutic, but it is not recommended for children
or for grownups. 81
Henning, moreover, is correct that the label "criminal" has a special social
significance. He is not alone in arguing that corporate punishment is appropriate
because it can stigmatize an entity and affect its reputation in ways that civil
liability cannot." The word "criminal" has its distinctive significance, however,
because this word means blameworthy. Someone who applies this word to objects
and entities that are not blameworthy uses the label falsely. The desired social
stigmatization may not materialize,8 3 and if it does, it occurs only because, once
the label is applied, some members of the public associate blameless things with
real criminals. You can fool some of the people all of the time, and that may be
enough.84

80. Peter J. Henning, CorporateCriminalLiability and the Potentialfor Rehabilitation,46 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
1417, 1426 (2009).
81. Kahan's penology echoes that of Emile Durkheim, who maintained that a society's imposition of criminal
punishment furthers its solidarity. See EMILE DuRKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR tN Socmry 62-66 (MacMillan
1933) (George Simpson, trans). To paraphrase both Durkheim and Kahan, imposing punishment expresses a
community's values and feels really good. The society that slays together stays together.
82. See, e.g., Buell, supra note 43, at 491 ("[T]he criminal process can impose a unique form of reputational
sanction, the effects of which can flow through to institutional members in ways that promise to deter individual
wrongdoing and promote group endeavors toward compliance."); Ann Foerschler, Corporate Criminal Intent:
Toward a Better Understandingof CorporateMisconduct, 78 CAL.L. REv. 1287, 1289-90 (1990); Stephen A.
Salzburg, The Control of Criminal Conduct in Organizations,71 B.U.L. REV. 421, 431-32 (1991); William S.
Laufer & Alan Strudler, CorporateIntentionality,Desert, and Variants of Vicarious Liability, 37 AM. CRIm. L.
REv. 1285, 1311-12 (2000).
83. Compare Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties, CriminalLaw and the Control of CorporateBehavior, 71
B.U.L. REv. 395, 414-15 (1991) (concluding that whether a firm's act is sanctioned as a civil or a criminal wrong
does not significantly affect the damage its reputation suffers), with Buell, supra note 43, at 504 ("Managers and
their counsel apparently do not see civil and criminal sanctions as substitutes.") and Assaf Hamdani & Alon
Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. L. REv. 271, 280 (2008) ("The perception that the
reputational consequences of a conviction could exceed even the substantial monetary penalties in any parallel
civil litigation explain why firms under investigation for criminal violations are willing to do almost whatever it
takes-including waiving attorney-client privilege, assisting the government's prosecution of their senior
officers, and paying millions of dollars in civil fines-to avoid an indictment.").
84. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMTs OF THE CRaiNAL SANcrIoN 273 (1968) ("The more indiscriminate we
are in treating conduct as criminal, the less stigma resides in the mere fact that a man has been convicted of
something called a crime.").
Samuel Buell argues that blaming and punishing collective entities is not simply expressive. He advances what
might be called a mixed deodand-frankpledge position. Buell observes that organizations influence the behavior
of their members, that people do in fact blame organizations, and that blaming organizations can influence people
inside and outside these organizations to make the organizations better. See Buell, supra note 43, at 497, 501.
One wonders whether Buell would extend his defense of punishing collectivities to non-commercial
groups-say, college fraternities and families. The members of some fraternities influence each other to behave
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In an essay titled In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability,85 Lawrence
Friedman defends a position like that of Kahan and Henning. He recognizes that
from a deterrent or "economic" perspective, "criminal liability fares poorly as
compared to civil liability."' 86 He also recognizes that, because a corporation has no
mind,.it cannot be an appropriate target of "pure Kantian retribution. 8 7 Friedman
nevertheless contends that expressive retributivism justifies corporate punishment.
"The expressive retributivist's commitment is 'to assert[] moral truth in the face of
' 88
its denial.'
Friedman argues that punishing corporations differs from punishing mahogany
in two ways. 89 First, echoing a theme of Pamela Bucy, he observes that a
corporation has an "identifiable persona" or "ethos" distinct from the personalities
of the people who work for it, 90 and second, he notes that a corporation can express
itself. 91 The Supreme Court held in FirstNationalBank of Boston v. Bellotti92 that
corporations have a constitutional right to speak.9 3
The Supreme Court's argument in Bellotti, however, was that the act of
incorporation should not cause people to lose a right they would otherwise

very badly, and so do the members of some families. Fraternities and families can develop bad reputations, and a
fraternity or family's reputation can prompt people to reform it. Buell argues for the punishment of a corporation
whenever one of its agents has committed a crime to "further[] the purposes of her institution." Id. at 530. Would
he equally favor the criminal conviction of a family whenever one of its members committed a crime to advance
the family's purposes? Or of a college fraternity when one of its members stole a keg of beer for a party?
85. Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARv. J. L. & PUB. PoLIcY 833
(2000). The author of this article teaches constitutional law at New England. He is not the Lawrence Friedman
who teaches legal history at Stanford.
86. Id. at 838.
87. Id. at 844-45.
88. Id. at 843 (quoting Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY AND JEAN HAMPTON,
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 125 (1988)).

Andrew Taslitz writes:
[A]s a newer generation of scholars and policymakers have increasingly come to recognize, this
vision of the corporation [as an aggregation of its individual members] is seriously flawed. There
are "social facts" with as real consequences for political culture as any physical, material facts. In
the social world, corporate persons are real. They have an identity and a unique character separate
and apart from that of their individual shareholders, directors, officers, and employees.
Andrew E. Taslitz, Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule, 76 Miss. L.J. 483, 532-33 (2006). Of course, in bygone social worlds and perhaps some current ones too,
demon-infested animals and inanimate objects were real, and this "social fact" had consequences. For Professor
Taslitz, the fact that most people believe something apparently makes it a "social" fact, and because "social" facts
are to be treated as real facts, he would presumably endorse the punishment of animals and objects by the people
who inhabited these worlds. Taslitz might endorse human sacrifice too. That the gods wanted human blood was
once a social fact with as real consequences for political culture as any physical, material facts.
89. See Friedman, supra note 85, at 844-45 (adverting to my earlier use of the deodand analogy).
90. Id. at 847-48. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability, 75 MiNN. L. REv.1095, 1099 (1991).
91. Friedman, supra note 87, at 848-52.
92. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
93. Id. at 784-85.
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possess-the right to speak as a group. 94 Imagine, then, an unincorporatedgroup
with an identifiable persona distinct from those of its members and one that can
express itself-a barbershop quartet. Imagine in addition that, without any
knowledge on the part of the tenor, bass or baritone, the lead singer of this group
has bribed the judge of a music contest, stolen four plaid sports coats, and poisoned
the lead singer of a rival quartet. Would Friedman express his commitment to
moral truth by convicting and punishing 95the entire quartet? If not, would the
group's incorporation change the outcome?
Or consider another body with a persona distinct from those of its members that
speaks as an entity-the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel. The release
of "torture memos" written by several lawyers of this Office during the administration of President George W. Bush has prompted discussion of whether the lawyers
should be prosecuted. 96 The Obama administration's Justice Department has
seemed reluctant to proceed. Its willingness to let bygones be bygones appears to
be influenced by the political distraction a trial would cause.
No one appears to have considered a less ad hominem way of resolving the
controversy-exempting the lawyers from prosecution while authorizing a trial of
the Office of Legal Counsel itself. If this office were found guilty, it (or perhaps the
entire Justice Department) could be placed on probation and required to implement
a compliance program, 97 or the Office might enter a deferred prosecution agreement and allow a monitor to review its compliance efforts.9 8
In addition, the Office might be fined. Critics might object that the sovereign
Justice Department cannot prosecute itself and also that it is pointless to take
money from the public treasury in order to pay this money into the public treasury.
After a $50 billion bailout, however, the federal government now owns 60 percent

94. Id. at 777 ("If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could silence
their proposed speech.").
95. In most states and in the federal courts, unions and unincorporated business associations can be convicted
of crimes. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SuBsTANitvE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.5d (2d ed., Thomson West 2003).
96. See, e.g., Editorial, The Torture Debate: The Lawyers, N. Y. TIMES, May 7, 2009, at A32 (discussing
whether the authors of the torture memos should be prosecuted or otherwise disciplined).
97. These sanctions are among those the Federal Sentencing Guidelines authorize for corporate offenders. See
U.S. SENTENciNG GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8D1.l(a)(3),'8D1.4(c)(1) (2008) (declaring that a convicted corporation with 50 or more employees is to be placed on probation and may be ordered to institute an effective
compliance program if it does not have one already). See generally Christopher A. Wray, Note, Corporate
ProbationUnder the New OrganizationalSentencing Guidelines, 101 YALE L.J. 2017 (1992).
98. See Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The CorporateMonitor: The New CorporateCzar?,
105 MicH. L. REv. 1713, 1714-1716 (2007). Critics might object that because all of the Bush administration
lawyers have left the Office of Legal Counsel, criminal sanctions are no longer necessary. The departure of all
breathing wrongdoers from a corporation, however, does not save it from punishment. The U.S. Attorneys'
Manual notes that "the culpable or knowledgeable personnel may have been ... fired, or they may have quit or
retired." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 54, at § 9-28.700(B). This circumstance leads the Manual to declare,
not that the Justice Department should refrain from prosecuting the corporation, but only that the "corporation's
cooperation may be critical in identifying potentially relevant actors and locating relevant evidence ... and in
doing so expeditiously." Id.
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of General Motors. 99 Presumably this company is still subject to prosecution for
the crimes committed by its agents. Moreover, whether the government owns a
rescued corporation or not, this corporation may use the money it has received
from the treasury to pay its fines to the treasury.'O° If the government considers the
defendant too big to fail, it may then draw more money from the treasury to enable
it to pay more fines to the treasury. The carousel might go round and round. In the
end, apart from some administrative expenses, the process could be costless and
wonderfully
expressive. If Lewis Carroll were still around, he could write about
lo
it.
it101

B. The Corporationas Frankpledge
Most defenders of corporate criminal liability view it as frankpledge. They
justify the punishment of corporations on the ground that innocent managers,
anxious to avoid the punishment of innocent shareholders, will act as patrol
officers. Everyone will police everyone else and will have appropriate incentives
to create a law-observant corporate culture.10 2 With the Thompson memorandum,
moreover, the parallel to frankpledge becomes sharper still. The group can avoid
punishment by delivering the individual wrongdoer to the authorities. Echoing the
Norman Kings of England, the Justice Department's Manual for United States
Attorneys declares, "Indicting corporations for wrongdoing enables the government to be a force for positive change of corporate culture, and a force to prevent,
discover, and punish serious crimes. 10 3

99. See Bill Vlasic, Chief Says G.M. Is Adapting Its Culture, N. Y TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009, at B3.
100. Rescued banks currently buy T-bills with money that the government has obtained by selling T-bills.
101. See LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS (Charles L. Dodgson ed., 1934) (1872).
102. See, e.g., Edgerton, supra note 53, at 835. Jennifer Arlen and Reinier Kraakman offer an elaborate
analysis of what combinations of strict respondeatsuperiorliability and responsibility for negligent monitoring
can best induce corporations to monitor their employees efficiently. Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman,
Controlling CorporateMisconduct: An Analysis of CorporateLiabilityRegimes, 72 N.Y.U.L. REv. 687 (1997).
From an economic perspective, a sound system of individual and corporate liability must advance three
objectives-inducing corporate employees to act efficiently, inducing corporate monitors to monitor efficiently,
and encouraging the optimal pricing of a company's product. Our current regime offers a curious mixture of strict
and fault-based liability. For the most part, our civil justice system seeks to promote the efficient conduct of
corporate employees by holding them liable only when they have acted negligently. At the same time, our criminal
justice system generally imposes liability only when an agent has inflicted harm with criminal intent. From a
"frankpledge" perspective, the principle of respondeatsuperiorin civil cases then seeks to promote the efficient
monitoring of employees by holding firms strictly (and jointly) liable for the employees' negligently produced
harms, and the principle of respondeatsuperior in criminal cases seeks to promote the efficient monitoring of
employees by holding firms strictly (and jointly) liable for the employees' intentionally produced harms.
Economists have long debated the relative merits of negligence and strict liability, but as far as I can tell, the
current regime does not reflect any coherent economic principle. I do not understand why anyone imagines that
this mixed system comes close to producing optimal prices. See generally Alan 0. Sykes,. The Boundaries of
Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101
HARv. L. REv. 563 (1988).
103. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 54, at § 9-28.200(A). Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the
monetary penalty imposed on a convicted corporation will be reduced by as much as 60 percent if it had an
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The Normans' version of frankpledge was in some respects less objectionable
than its twenty-first century analogue. William the Conqueror and his successors
imposed a duty of policing on every member of a tithing and imposed monetary
sanctions when the tithing failed to perform this duty effectively. The Normans did
not imagine that the tithing was guilty of the crimes committed by the people it
deserved punishment for these crimes
failed to apprehend or that all of its members
10 4
rather than for their own failures to police.
Our own criminal justice system frequently presses offenders to aid in the
apprehension and prosecution of other offenders. Ordinarily, however, it does not
create crimes and threaten the innocent simply to gain their cooperation. Our
justice system does not, for example, declare a drug dealer's family, friends, and
roommates guilty of his crimes simply because declaring them criminals would
strongly encourage their cooperation. Even if careful economic analysis could
vicarious liability cost-effective, it would cause most
show the imposition of 1this
05
non-economists to gag.
Moreover, as Jennifer Arlen has noted, corporate criminal liability can backfire.
It can prompt managers to do less policing than they would if their firms faced only
civil liability, for internal policing may produce information that will lead to a
firm's indictment and conviction. 106 Consider, for example, the advice a lawyer
might give a brokerage firm that is considering whether to tape-record its brokers'
calls: "To the extent the proposed recordings deter brokers from committing fraud,
they will reduce the firm's potential criminal liability. But if the deterrence is
imperfect, some tapes may contain evidence of fraud. These tapes will be subject
to subpoena, and when the government obtains them, it may use them to indict the
firm and perhaps put it out of business. 10 7
I do not think highly of the institution of frankpledge, but it seems less silly than
hating an artificial person. Holding the members of a group responsible for the
other members' crimes is not as strange as imagining that a legal fiction deserves

"effective" compliance program in place prior to the crime. U.S. SENTENCING GtIDEL.NES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f)(1)
(2008).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
105. See State v. Akers, 400 A.2d 38, 40 (N.H. 1979) (holding unconstitutional a statute that punished parents
when their children drove off-highway vehicles on the highways).
106. See Jennifer Arlen, The PotentiallyPerverse Effects of CorporateCriminalLiability, 23 J. LEGAL. STuD.
833, 836-37 (1994).
107. See Arlen & Kraakmann, supranote 102, at 708-09. The prospect of civil liability has a double effect too;
a firm may decide not to monitor when monitoring could produce damaging evidence that opposing civil litigants
might discover. If corporate managers dread criminal conviction more than civil liability, however, the threat of
criminal prosecution is likely to magnify their fear of generating damaging evidence.
Especially because even one criminal act can potentially cause a firm's demise and no one knows how
prosecutors will respond to the firm's monitoring efforts, the effect of our regime of criminal liability on the

behavior of corporate managers is uncertain. A regime of strict liability on paper administered by prosecutors who
may consider innocence a full defense, a partial defense, or no defense at all is not one in which managers can
easily calculate the optimal investment in discouraging improper conduct.
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punishment.
VI. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPETING VIEWS

This section considers where the "deodand" and "frankpledge" views of
corporate criminal liability would take the law. Neither perspective justifies the
federal courts' current standard of corporate liability, but the differing perspectives
point to differing reforms. This section evaluates these reforms and explains why
the political prospects of both reform proposals are dim. Although the current
standard of corporate liability is indefensible, it affords great power to prosecutors.
This section examines how prosecutors have used and abused their power. It ends
with a description of how judges who accepted the "frankpledge" perspective
would sentence corporate offenders.
A. The Respondeat Superior Standardof CorporateLiability
Neither the "deodand" view of corporate criminal liability nor the "frankpledge"
view justifies the respondeatsuperiorstandard now employed in the federal courts
to determine a corporation's criminal guilt.10 8
1. The Deodand View
A corporation's "ethos" or "persona"-the essence alleged to justify its punishment for "expressive retributive" reasons-is not established by the wrongful act
of a single employee, and the isolated wrongful act of a "high managerial agent" 10 9
may not manifest a corporation's "personality" either. Even the "rude Kukis of
Southern Asia," who allegedly punished trees for fatal falls,"' might have had
difficulty hating an otherwise virtuous corporation with tens of thousands of
employees whenever one employee did something wrong.
Blaming an entity apparently demands an atmospheric assessment of the entity's
spirit, and Pamela Bucy has proposed that juries make this assessment. She
advocates what she calls "the corporate ethos standard" and says that this standard
"directs criminal liability toward only those corporations which are 'deserving' of
prosecution as demonstrated by their lawless ethos."'1
Bucy elaborates:
108. See supra text accompanying notes 33-40.
109. See supra text accompanying note 35 (describing the liability standard of the Model Penal Code).
110. HOLMES, supra note 10, at 44.
111. Bucy, supra note 90, at 1157. Bucy explains that the word ethos "refers to the characteristic spirit or
prevalent tone of sentiment of a community, institution, or system." Id. at 1123. For example, Texaco is reputedly
selfish, greedy, mean and secretive; Exxon tranquil and elegant; and Shell lordly and sedate. Id. at 1124 (citing
ANTHONY SAMPSON, Thm SEVEN SssRSTs (1975)).
Of course organizations do differ in their ethoi. Some in fact are wholly devoted to criminal activity. The most
thoroughly criminal organizations, however-for example, the Bloods, the Crips, and the Mafia-are not usually
incorporated. Although these organizations sometimes have been named as defendants in civil injunctive actions,
see generally Scott E. Atkinson, Note, The Outer Limits of Gang Injunctions, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1693 (2006), I

HeinOnline -- 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1378 2009

2009]

Two WAYS TO THINK ABOUT CORPoRATE PUNISHMENT

1379

To ascertain the ethos of a corporation, and to determine if this ethos
encouraged the criminal conduct at issue, the factfinder should examine: the
corporate hierarchy, the corporate goals and policies, the corporation's historical treatment of prior offenses, the corporation's efforts to educate and monitor
employees' compliance with the law, and the corporation's compensation
11 2
scheme, especially its policy on indemnification of corporate employees.
Bucy would ask juries to consider whether a corporation's board did its job or
instead operated as a figurehead,1 13 whether corporate goals were "so unrealistic
that they encourage[d] illegal behavior,"'1 14 whether employees were "required to
sign a statement each year indicating that they are familiar with pertinent
government regulations and indicating that that they realize such violations will
result in dismissal,"' 15 whether the corporation had an ombudsman,1 16 and more.
A medieval academic similarly might have opposed the indiscriminate punishment of objects that killed people and might have proposed a more careful
assessment of each object's ethos. Was an accused wheel well designed? Was it
made of the best material? Was it inspected and repaired on a regular basis? Had it
previously provided useful service? Had it been involved in prior accidents?
Bucy's proposal provides few standards, invites prosecutors to appeal to the
anti-corporate sentiments of some jurors, and probably would yield outcomes
based mostly on the jurors' proclivities, the trial lawyers' rhetoric, and how much
harm the defendant's agents had caused. The impossibility of translating deodand
sentiments into an operational standard of liability reflects the "let's pretend"
character of the group-blame concept,' 17 and the difficulty of formulating anything
other than knee-jerk standards of culpability suggests placing the punishment of
organizations on a different basis. The goal of corporate criminal punishment
an appropriate level of monitoring
should be instrumental. It should be to induce
118
within an organization and nothing else.
2. The Frankpledge View
If the goal of group liability is to encourage appropriate monitoring, the issue
have never seen one of them prosecuted. Neither legislatures nor prosecutors nor anyone else has seen a need to
prosecute these organizations in addition to the criminals who inhabit them.
112. Bucy, supra note 90, at 1101.
113. Id. at1129.
114. Id. at1133.
115. Id. at1136.
116. Id.at1137.
117. Bucy's proposed standard is less anthropomorphic than the standard proposed by two other champions of
the deodand perspective. William Laufer and Alan Strudler would have a jury determine "whether the corporation
purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently engaged in the illegal act"--something the jury could infer by
examining "whether the average corporation of like size, complexity, functionality, and structure, given the
circumstances presented, would have the required state of mind." Laufer & Strudler, supranote 82, at 1310.
118. See Coffee, supra note 52, at 448 ("The study of corporate criminal responsibility too long has been led
astray by commentators seeking to fashion retributive justifications and anthropomorphic analogies.").
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should be whether the group has monitored appropriately. The Norman inventors
of frankpledge, however, did not address this question directly. Instead, they
applied a standard of strict liability, presuming a failure to monitor whenever one
member of a tithing escaped punishment for a serious crime.
The modem law of corporate criminality similarly employs a strict liability
standard, but the modem standard is worse. For one thing, even if the criminal has
not escaped, this standard presumes a failure to monitor whenever a member of the
group has committed a crime. The group's delivery of the wrongdoer to the
authorities may prompt forbearance or leniency, but it does not eradicate the
group's responsibility. Moreover, the modem law treats any criminal act by any
member of a 10,000-person group as proof of the other members' failure. That
position is roughly 1000 times more misguided than treating the wrongful act of
any member of a ten-person group as conclusive proof of the other members'
default. A teacher who cannot determine which of his students misbehaved may
keep an entire class after school, but even the most tyrannical teacher does not
detain every student in the school system.
The rule of strict liability arose because people believed that the acts of an agent
could be attributed to the agent's principal, and that was that. The rule had no
articulated purpose. Courts and legislatures had decided to punish corporations,
and they saw no other way to do it. The rule of respondeat superior never had a
reason, and there is no reason to retain it.
When one rejects deodand mythology and recognizes that the goal of corporate
punishment is to ensure an appropriate level of internal policing, the appropriate
principle of liability becomes clear. Whether a criminal case against a corporation
can be triggered by the criminal act of any employee or only by an act approved or
tolerated by a high managerial agent, the defendant should at a minimum be
permitted to show as an affirmative defense that it had an appropriate compliance
program in place prior to this act. When a corporation implements a suitable
compliance program, it does what the authors of the law of corporate criminal
liability (at least the non-superstitious authors) meant it to do. The government
should ask for no more.1 19
Strict respondeat superior liability gives managers an incentive to establish
effective compliance programs, but an affirmative defense of due care or appropriate monitoring would give them a stronger incentive. The expected benefits of
compliance programs are greater when they can lead to a defense than when they
cannot. Contrary to common intuition, strict liability probably weakens rather than

119. It is difficult for a judge, jury, or prosecutor to know when a firm's investments in monitoring are optimal.
Recognizing appropriate monitoring as an affirmative defense, however, casts the burden of uncertainty on the
defendant. When a firm recognizes that it may bear this burden, it is likely to over-invest rather than under-invest
in compliance programs.
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strengthens the deterrent force of the criminal law.120 The Supreme Court has in
fact limited the respondeat superior principle in sexual harassment cases for
precisely this reason. Giving "credit... to employers who make reasonable efforts
to discharge their duty" encourages them to establish programs to stop harassment. 1 1 It does so more effectively than holding them strictly liable for whatever
harassment occurs.
Rewarding firms for establishing compliance programs encourages them to
establish compliance programs. In addition, the proposed affirmative defense
removes the incentive not to monitor that strict respondeat superior liability
sometimes creates. 122 A firm need not fear that an appropriate compliance program
would produce incriminating information that the government could use to destroy
it.123

The United States Attorneys' Manual lists "the existence and effectiveness of
the corporation's pre-existing compliance program" as one of nine factors to be
considered in determining whether to file charges. 124 These factors are described
as "additional" to "the factors normally considered in the sound exercise of
prosecutorial judgment: the sufficiency of the evidence; the likelihood of success
at trial; the probable deterrent, rehabilitative, and other consequences of conviction; and the adequacy of noncriminal charges." 125 The listed factors "are intended
to be illustrative" rather than "exhaustive,"' 126 and "the existence of a compliance
program is not sufficient, in and of itself, to justify not charging a corporation for
27
criminal misconduct undertaken by its officers, directors, employees, or agents." 1
The Manual does not notably confine the discretion of prosecutors. A prosecutor
who considers the listed factors and finds himself with some yeses, some no's, and
some maybes can do whatever he likes. Indeed, even a prosecutor with all yeses or
all no's can do whatever he likes. The Justice Department has never explained why
the existence of an appropriatecompliance program should not be "sufficient, in
and of itself, to justify not charging a corporation for criminal misconduct

120. See Dan M. Kahan, Ignoranceof the Law is an Excuse-but Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REv. 127,

133-35 (1997) (arguing that when the law treats reasonable mistakes of law as a defense, it encourages knowledge
of the law more effectively than when it imposes strict liability for mistakes).

121. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806.(1998).
122. See supratext accompanying notes 106-07.

123. A possible objection to the proposed defense is that it would not force firms to "internalize" some of the
costs of their activities and would lead to inefficient pricing. Promoting optimal pricing, however, is much more a
goal of civil liability than of criminal punishment, and the proposed defense would not relieve corporations of
their civil obligations. These firms would remain obligated to compensate the victims of crimes committed by
their agents on their behalf. Forcing firms to internalize the costs of their activities is one thing; punishing them
when they have done everything they can fairly be expected to do is something else.
124. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supranote 54, at § 9-28.300(A) (2008).

125. Id.
126. Id. at § 9-28.300(B).
127. Id. at § 9-28.800(A).

HeinOnline -- 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1381 2009

1382

AMERIcAN CRImIAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1359

undertaken by its officers, directors, employees, or agents."' 128 There appears to be
only one thing beyond an appropriate compliance program the government could
want-perfection. The suitability of a compliance program, moreover, should not
be judged by the length of the chancellor's (or prosecutor's) foot. Rather, the
question should be one of cost-effectiveness: if additional or different expenditures
on compliance would be unlikely to prevent more harm than they would cost, a
corporate defendant should not be expected to make them. 129
B. The Real Purpose of the Respondeat Superior Standard
Although the current standard of corporate liability makes no sense from either
the "deodand" or the "frankpledge" perspective, a recent New York Times column
by former Attorney General John Ashcroft revealed why this standard has endured
for 100 years and may last 100 more.
Ashcroft's column praised federal deferred prosecution agreements:
These court-authorized agreements ... under certain circumstances offer[]
more appropriate methods of providing justice in the best interests of the
public as well as a company's employees and shareholders. They avoid the
destructiveness of indictments and allow companies to remain in business
while 0operating under the increased scrutiny of federally appointed monitors.

13

Ashcroft's column did not directly answer the question, "compared to what?," but
its answer was clear: compared to full enforcement of the law.
DPAs and NPAs do look great when compared to full enforcement of the law,
but full enforcement of the law is unthinkable. Every Fortune 500 company
presumably has had at least one employee who violated a federal criminal law
while carrying out his duties. The law of corporate crime thus makes every Fortune
500 company subject to prosecution, conviction, and punishment. In addition to
the reputational damage a criminal conviction is likely to bring, conviction may
bar a company from obtaining needed business licenses, holding a national bank
franchise, receiving Medicaid and Medicare payments, auditing the accounts of
publicly traded corporations, and contracting with the government. 131 The respondeat superior standard apparently empowers the Justice Department to put most
American companies out of business and to bring the economy to a standstill-and
to do so just as other federal agencies are bolstering failing companies to keep the

128. Id.
129. I suggest some qualifications to this proposition in infra text accompanying notes 175-77.
130. John Ashcroft, BailoutJustice, N.Y. TbMEs, May 5, 2009, at A27.

131. See Hamdani & Klement, supranote 83, at 278-79 (discussing the potential collateral consequences of a
criminal conviction to a firm in a regulated industry).
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32
economy from coming to a standstill.1
Ashcroft provided an example:

In September 2007, ... the Justice Department and the nation's five largest
manufacturers of prosthetic hips and knees reached agreements over allegations that they gave kickbacks to orthopedic surgeons who used a particular
company's artificial hip and knee reconstruction replacement products. The
allegations meant that the companies faced indictment, prosecution and a
potential end to their business.
Think of the effect on the community if these companies had been shuttered:
empioyees would have lost their jobs, shareholders and pensioners would have
lost their savings and countless people in need of hip and knee replacement
would have been out of luck, as these five companies accounted for 95 percent
of the market. The Justice Department could have wiped out an entire industry
that has a vital role in American health care.
Instead, the companies paid settlements to the government totaling $311
million. They agreed to be monitored by private sector individuals and firms
with reputations for integrity and public service .... The monitoring costs
were borne exclusively by the companies, saving taxpayers tens of millions of
dollars that could be then used for other investigations .... In these types of
circumstances, a deferred prosecution agreement is clearly better for every133
one.

Of course the nation need not fear a prosecutor-prompted economic collapse.
No prosecutor wants to put a corporation out of business simply because one rogue
employee committed a crime. Federal prosecutors merely want the power to put
every corporation out of business whenever a low-level employee has committed a
crime. 134 This power enables prosecutors to impose whatever sanctions they like
for whatever conduct they do wish to punish. The power to do the unthinkable lets
prosecutors do the thinkable without much sweat. When prosecutors exercise their

132. Ashcroft noted this irony-but only as an argument for entering deferred prosecution agreements, not as a
reason for revising the standards of corporate criminal responsibility and restricting the power of prosecutors.
133. Id. In considering whether the agreements Ashcroft described were "clearly better for everyone," note
that the tens of millions of dollars in monitoring costs and the $311 million paid directly to the government
probably will be reflected in the price of prosthetic knees and hips. Because people enjoy walking and hate pain,
one imagines that the demand for these products is not very elastic, and if the financial burdens are spread evenly
throughout the industry (95 percent of the market), manufacturers can treat them in the same way they would treat
an increase in the cost of steel. These costs probably can be passed on to consumers without much difficulty.
Because manufacturers forced patients to pay too much by giving kickbacks to surgeons, a criminal remedy was
required, and the remedy was to force the patients to pay more.
134. The U.S. Attorneys' Manual declares, "[I]t may not be appropriate to impose liability upon a corporation,
particularly one with a robust compliance program in place, under a strict respondeat superior theory for the
single isolated act of a rogue employee." DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 54, at § 9-28.500(A). Note that the
language of this provision, like the language of most of the rest of the Manual, does not commit the Department of
Justice to anything. Even when a corporation has "a robust compliance program in place," the Department "may"
*decide "to impose liability under a strict respondeat superior theory for the single isolated act of a rogue
employee."
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sweeping powers responsibly (as nearly all of them believe that they do), they may
save the jobs of thousands of people and enable companies to stay in business-all
as measured from the fantasy baseline of full-enforcement. Like John Ashcroft, the
prosecutors may then congratulate themselves on their restraint.
Practitioners at two recent conferences on corporate criminality agreed that, 1in
35
negotiating with the government, corporate suspects have a knife at a gunfight.
Even when an accused corporation has a plausible defense, it usually cannot risk
the adverse consequences of an indictment, let alone a conviction. The corporation's only bargaining chip comes from the reluctance of prosecutors to pull the
trigger. As one defense attorney explained, "If you're Boeing, the government no
more wants to put you out of business than you want to go out of business."
Defense attorneys report, however, that corporate boards do not respond favorably
to the argument, "We don't think the government means to shoot." These boards
136
instruct counsel to agree to whatever they must in order to avoid an indictment.
Although federal prosecutors pride themselves on their responsibility and
restraint, they cannot always be trusted. In his New York Times column, John
Ashcroft acknowledged that he served as a paid monitor for one of the five
prosthetic manufacturing companies whose DPAs he praised. 37 He failed to note
that the company he monitored, Zimmer Holdings, had agreed to pay his
consulting firm, The Ashcroft Group, between $20 and $52 million for 18 months
of service.' 38 By negotiating the Zimmer Holdings agreement, the United States
Attorney for New Jersey, Christopher J. Christie, had benefitted his former boss,
Mr. Ashcroft, at least as clearly as he had benefitted the public. 139 In another DPA,
Christie aided his law school alma mater, Seton Hall, by requiring Bristol-Myers
Squibb to endow a chair there in business ethics with a contribution of $5

135. Conference, Achieving the Right Balance: The Role of CorporateCriminal Law in Ensuring Corporate
Compliance,Georgetown University Law Center (Apr. 21, 2009) (video available at http://www.instituteforlegal
reform.com/componentlilr-events/30/item/62.html); Conference, Regulation by Prosecutors,New York University
Law School (May 8, 2009) (video available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/adminofcriminallaw/events/
regulationbyprosecutors/ECMPRO_- 062107).
136. A former federal prosecutor comments:
[T]he process of negotiating a deferred prosecution agreement... is not really a negotiation. Any
push back by the company on a provision that the government requests is not only going to be shot
down, but the government may see it as a reflection that the company's claimed contrition is not
genuine..
Interview of David Pitofsky, Partner Goodwin ProcterLLP, New York, New York, CoRP. CRIM REP., Nov. 28,
2005, at 8, availableat http://corporatecrimereporter.com/pitofskyinterview010806.htm.
137. Ashcroft, supra note 130.
138. See Claire Heininger, Oversight of Corporate Monitors is Urged: Congressmen Say Ashcroft Contract
Shows Need for More Regulation, N.J. STAR-LEDGFa, Apr. 3, 2009, at 26.
139. See Cynthia Burton, Christie Speaks to CongressionalSubcommittee, PHILA.INQUIRER, June 26, 2009, at
B 1 ("The estimate for Ashcroft's fees is between $20 million and $52 million for monitoring the rehabilitation of
Zimmer holdings ....A copy of a bill from Ashcroft, distributed by committee Democratic staff, showed little
specific backup for the charges.").
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million."4 And when Christie left the U.S. Attorney's Office to run for governor,
he accepted $23,800 in campaign contributions from people connected with the
law firm of Herbert J. Stern, a former U.S. Attorney and federal judge whom
Christie had chosen for a $3 million monitoring contract.1 41 The New York Times
reports, "The Justice Department has appointed at least 30 former prosecutors and
other government officials as well-paid corporate monitors in arrangements that
allow companies to avoid criminal prosecution, according to ... data released.., by Congress.'

142

Recent Justice Department memoranda limit the power of U.S. Attorneys to
144
select their friends as monitors 143 and to direct payments to favored law schools,
but even the best intentioned prosecutors may not merit the credit they give
themselves for reasonableness and good government. Whether the compliance
programs and monitors imposed by DPAs and NPAs can justify their high cost is
an essentially unexamined question.
Federal prosecutors have shown little awareness that cost-effectiveness is the
issue. The U.S. Attorneys' Manual invites prosecutors to consider whether a
corporation's compliance program "is adequately designed for maximum effectiveness in preventing and detecting wrongdoing." 145 But of course there is no
maximum. The amount of money a firm could spend on monitoring is limited only
by the amount of money it has. It might place a monitor or two at every employee's
elbow, and no standard indicates at what point short of absurdity it must stop. Once
an employee of the firm has committed a crime, the firm's monitoring obligations
140. See Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the 'New Regulators': Current Trends in Deferred
ProsecutionAgreements, 45 AM. Cium. L. REv. 159, 174 (2008); Sue Reisinger, New DOJPolicy: Just Call it the
ChristopherChristieAmendment, LAW.COM, May 21, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1202421573691
(last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
141. See Josh Margolin & Claire Heininger, Foes See Tarnish on Christie's Sparkling Image, Campaign
Contributions Smack of Pay-to-Play,They Charge,N.J. STAR-LEDGER, Apr. 5, 2009, at 17. At the end of his first
six months as monitor of a medical and dental school, Stem submitted bills totaling $5.8 million-$199,600 for
his own services at a rate of $500 per hour, $992,787 for the services of other lawyers in his office, and the
remainder for two accounting firms. Stem became the school's monitor after it acknowledged overbilling
Medicaid by just under $5 million. See David Kocieniewski, Cost of Inquiry at University in New Jersey Draws
Criticism, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at B 1.
At this writing, Christopher Christie has won the June 2009 Republican primary, and the most recent poll
indicates that he will be elected Governor of New Jersey. See Cynthia Burton, Christie Reachesfor the Urban
Vote, PHmIA. INQUIRER, July 15, 2009, at B1.

142. Eric Lichtblau & Kitty Bennett, 30 Ex-Government OfficialsGot Lucrative Postsas CorporateMonitors,
N.Y TIMES, May 23, 2008, at A23.
143. See Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads
of Dep't Components & U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Justice 3 (Mar. 7, 2008), availableat http://www.usdoj.govl
dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf (providing that "United States Attorneys and Assistant Attorneys' General may not make, accept, or veto the selection of monitor candidates unilaterally" and that "the Office
of the Deputy Attorney General must approve the monitor").
144. See Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Dep't
Components & U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Justice (May 14, 2008) (on file with author) (declaring that DPAs
and NPAs may not require payments to private parties other than crime victims).
145. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 54, at § 9-28.800(B).

HeinOnline -- 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1385 2009

1386

AMERICAN CRimiNAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1359

depend on what feels right to a United States Attorney unconstrained by any
standards.
The U.S. Attorneys' Manual acknowledges "that no compliance program can
ever prevent all criminal activity by a corporation's employees,"' 46 but defense
attorneys at a recent conference on corporate crime noted that prosecutors paid
little attention to this provision. 1 47 When these attorneys pleaded for mercy by
pointing to their corporate clients' compliance programs, prosecutors responded
that the programs could not have been effective if the crime occurred.
A 2009 study purports to examine "whether settlement agreements with corporate monitors actually work to improve corporate behavior going forward."1 4 8 It
concludes that "in general" these agreements "are at risk of not achieving their
goals on any consistent basis.' 4 9 In 2005, Kimberly Krawiec reviewed the
available empirical evidence on the effectiveness of corporate ethics and conduct
codes, internal compliance structures, and training programs intended to reduce
sexual harassment and increase diversity. She reported that the evidence was
sparse and "decidedly mixed, with many of the most recent and methodologically
sound studies finding no significant correlation between the most widely used
internal compliance structures and reduced organizational misconduct."' 5 0 Notably, none of the three large-scale studies that purported to test the effectiveness of
the compliance programs favored by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines indicated
that these programs had reduced illegal conduct. Two of the three studies in fact
"found unanticipated positive correlations between internal compliance structures
and legal violations.''15 t How much compliance programs serve their stated

146. Id.
147. Video: Panel 3: How Should Corporate Compliance Programs Be Factored into Government Decisions,
Conference on Achieving the Right Balance: The Role of Corporate Criminal Law in Ensuring Corporate
Compliance, held by Georgetown University Law Center (Apr. 21, 2009) (availableat http://www.chambercast.
com/ramgen/video/ilr/090526d.rm).
148. Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can CorporateMonitorshipsImprove CorporateCompliance?, 34 J. CORP.

L. 679, 681 (2009).
149. Id. at 682. Essentially, this study shows only that ethics and compliance officers do not think highly of the
former prosecutors and others who are appointed as corporate monitors. The professionals complain that these
monitors lack experience, gain little understanding during their one-shot appointments, and focus more on

compliance mechanics than on developing an appropriate corporate culture. One senses that the compliance
officers might prefer the selection of members of their own fraternity. Their professional association, the Society
of Corporate Governance and Ethics, now offers training and an examination leading to certification as a

compliance and ethics professional. Id. at 692.
150. Kimberly Krawiec, Corporate Decisionmaking:OrganizationalMisconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent
Model, 32 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 571, 591-97 (2005).
151. Id. at 593 (citing M. Cash Matthews, Codes of Ethics: OrganizationalBehavior and Misbehavior, in 9
REsEARcH IN CORPoRATE SociAL PERFORmANcE Am PoLicY 107, 108-09, 125 (William C. Frederick & Lee E.
Preston eds., 1987); Marie McKendall et al., Ethical Compliance Programsand CorporateIllegality: Testing the
Assumptions of the CorporateSentencing Guidelines,37 J. Bus. EThics 367 (2002); Marie A. McKendall & John
A. Wagner Ill, Motive, Opportunity,Choice and CorporateIllegality, 8 ORG. Sci. 624 (1997)).
A positive correlation between compliance programs and violations might suggest only that the managers of
firms whose employees commit violations are likely to implement compliance programs. The positive correlation
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purposes and how much they are gimmickry and posturing remain open questions,
Neither John Ashcroft nor any other Attorney General in the past century has
sought a narrowing of the respondeat superior standard of corporate liability.
Although half the states employ narrower standards, 5 2 Congress seems very
unlikely to follow their lead. An alliance of Ralph Nader, the Justice Department,
and most Members of Congress could be expected to resist any effort to deny
prosecutors an important "tool" in the fight against corporate crime. Like the rest
of the federal criminal justice system, the respondeatsuperior standard transforms
prosecutors into czars while the politicians stand
and say "yes, yes, yes.' 1 3 This
54
standard serves its real purpose marvelously. 1
C. The Prospectfor Reform: Some PoliticalNotes
For thirty years and more, writers have proposed that a corporation should not
be punished when it can "prov[e] by a preponderance of the evidence that it, as an
organization, exercised due diligence to prevent the crime."' 5 5 As noted, however,

between the number of fire trucks at a fire and the size of the fire does not indicate that fire trucks are ineffective at
fighting fires.
I doubt that any quantitative methodology can reveal whether monitors and compliance programs reduce crime,
but researchers can determine whether the telephone numbers set up to receive whistleblowers' calls receive
well-founded complaints and whether corporate employees believe that the firm's compliance programs have
changed either their own behavior or the behavior of others. I am more sympathetic to employee surveys of this
sort than Krawiec appears to be, but the evidence produced by these surveys is as inconclusive as that produced by
the data crunchers. Id. at 592.
152. See supra note 35.
153. The last half-century has seen many Congressional contributions to the prosecutors' "tool kit"-among
them, the federal sentencing guidelines, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3625 (2006); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (2006);
mandatory minimum drug and firearms sentences, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 860, 929, & 3561(b)(1) (2006); RICO,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (Supp. 2009); the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today or PROTECT Act, Pub. L. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003); and the declaration that a scheme or
artifice to defraud includes a "scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right to honest services." See
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (Supp. 2009). See generally William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100
MIcH. L. REv. 505, 510 (2001) ("Mhe story of American criminal law is a story of tacit cooperation between
prosecutors and legislators, each of whom benefits from more and broader crimes.").
154. Preet Bharara argues that "efforts to reduce the risk of prosecutorial excess are... better directed at the
source of prosecutors' leverage rather than at their conduct." BHtaR, A, supranote 73, at 54. He observes, "[T]he
potential for excess will continue to loom large so long as prosecutors may persuasively (and legally) threaten to
indict, and thus potentially destroy, any company, no matter how blameless, for the misdeeds of a single, low-level
rogue employee." Id. at 56. Bharara is now the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. See
Benjamin Weiser, Schumer Aide Is ConfirmedAs United States Attorney, New York Tmms, Aug. 8, 2009, at A16.
155. The quoted language appears in Note, Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating
CorporateBehavior Through CriminalSanctions,92 HARv.L. REv. 1243, 1257 (1979). For earlier suggestions of
the same sort of defense, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(5) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (providing that in some
circumstances "it shall be a defense if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the high
managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence
to prevent its commission"); Note, CorporateCriminalLiabilityforActs in Violation of Company Policy,50 GEO.
L.J. 547, 563 n.73 (1962) (proposing that a corporation be allowed to "rebut a presumption of responsibility for
[some] crimes ... by showing that the corporation in good faith did everything within its power to prevent the
commission of the offense"). For more recent support of an "appropriate monitoring" defense, see John S. Baker,
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members of Congress are not likely to approve a measure that opponents could
characterize as soft on corporate crime.
At a recent conference on the role of corporate criminal law, former Deputy
Attorney General Larry D. Thompson, the author of the Thompson Memorandum,1 56 suggested a less political route to the approval of an "appropriate
monitoring" defense. Thompson-now the general counsel of PepsiCo and a
supporter of the defense-proposed that the Supreme Court adopt this defense as
an amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 157 Thompson's
proposal, however, appears to conflict with the Rules Enabling Act, which
provides that procedural rules may "not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
58
1

right."'

Although the Supreme Court is unlikely to approve an "appropriate monitoring"
defense as an amendment to the criminal rules, it might do so as a matter of federal
common law in an appropriate case. The Supreme Court and other courts altered
the traditional common law when, extending the holding of New York Central
beyond cases in which Congress had spoken to the issue, they approved general
corporate criminal liability and the respondeatsuperior standard. Courts have the
power to revise their own handiwork.
A recent amicus brief in the Second Circuit authored by Andrew Weissmann and
other Jenner & Block lawyers advocated judicial revision of the respondeat
superiorstandard. 159 This brief emphasized that recent Supreme Court decisions
have limited the application of this standard even in civil cases. For example, in
Faragherv. City of Boca Raton,1 6° the Court held that an employer might be
civilly liable for a supervisory employee's sexual harassment of a subordinate, but
it allowed the employer "to show as an affirmative defense ... that [it] had
exercised reasonable care to avoid harassment and to eliminate it when it might
occur, and that the complaining employee had failed to act with like reasonable

Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of FederalProsecution, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 321 (2004);
Richard S. Gruner & Louis M. Brown, OrganizationalJustice: Recognizing and Rewarding the Good Citizen
Corporation,21 J. CoRp. L. 731, 764-65 (1996); H. Lowell Brown, Vicarious Criminal Liability of Corporations
for the Acts of their Employees and Agents, 41 Loy. L.. REv. 279, 308-28 (1995); Andrew Weissmann & David
Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 414 (2007); Ellen S. Podgor, A New
CorporateWorld Mandatesa "Good Faith" Affirmative Defense, 44 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1537 (2007); Charles J.
Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, CorporateCompliance Programsas a Defense to CriminalLiability: Can a Corporation
Save Its Soul?, 47 RutGERS L. REv. 605 (1995).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 62-78.
157. Larry D. Thompson, Remarks to the Conference on Achieving the Right Balance: The Role of Corporate
Criminal Law in Ensuring Corporate Compliance, Georgetown University Law School, April 21, 2009 (video
available athttp://www.instituteforlegalreform.con/component/ilr-events/30fitem/62.htnl); see also Larry Thompson, The Blameless Corporation,46 AM. Cium. L. REv. 1323 (2009).
158. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
159. Brief for the Association of Corporate Counsel et alas Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, United States
v. Ionia Mgnt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2009) (07-5801-CR).
160. 524 U.S. 775 (1998); see also Burlington Indus, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (a companion case
that the Court analyzed much as it did Faragher).
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care to take advantage of the employer's safeguards and otherwise to prevent harm
' 16 1
that could have been avoided."
Similarly, in Kolstad v. American Dental Association,162 the Court held that an
employer would not be liable for punitive damages simply because a supervisory
employee had intentionally discriminated on the basis of sex in hiring. Even in a
case of intentional discrimination, punitive damages would be inappropriate if the
discriminatory act was "contrary to the employer's 'good-faith efforts to comply
' 16 3
with Title VII. ""
The Court spoke of the "perverse incentives" that strict
adherence to the respondeat superior principle would create,' 64 and it said,
"'Giving punitive damages protection to employers who make good-faith efforts
to prevent discrimination in the workplace accomplishes' Title 1Vi's
objective of
'motivating employers to detect and deter Title VII violations."", 65
Weissmann and his colleagues argued that the reasons for modifying the
respondeatsuperior standard in criminal cases were at least as compelling as the
reasons for modifying it in sexual harassment cases. Moreover, the reasons the
Supreme Court gave for protecting corporations from liability for punitive damages Were also reasons for protecting them from criminal conviction and punishment. The Second Circuit, however, summarily rejected the arguments of Weissmann's brief
on the ground that they were "contrary to the precedent of our
6
Circuit.'

16

A final route to the approval of an appropriate monitoring defense runs through
the Department of Justice. Unlikely though the prospect may seem, a fair-minded
Attorney General might abandon the noncommittal pablum-language of the U.S.
Attorneys' Manual and announce that the Department will not charge corporations
1 67
with crimes when they have implemented appropriate compliance programs.
United States Attorneys and their assistants would be unlikely to be too generous
to corporate suspects in determining when this de facto defense applied.
D. Sentencing Corporations
Viewing the punishment of corporations as frankpledge rather than deodand has
implications for sentencing corporations. Because corporate criminal punishment
is not really criminal punishment as people customarily understand it, harsh

161. Faragher,524 U.S. at 805.
162. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
163. Id. at 545 (quoting Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J.,
dissenting)).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 545-46 (quoting Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 974 (Tatel, J., dissenting)).
166. United States v. Ionia Mgmt S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 2009).
167. Oddly, scholars continue to express hope for rulemaking 6 y prosecutors. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas,
ProsecutorialRegulation Versus ProsecutorialAccountability,157 U. PA. L. Rev. 959, 1003-07 (2009); Rachel E.
Barkow, InstitutionalDesign andthe Policingof Prosecutors:Lessonsfrom AdministrativeLaw, 61 STAN. L. REv.
869 (2009); Erik Luna, PrincipledEnforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BuFF.CmIM. L. REv. 515, 593-604 (2000).
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exemplary penalties are inappropriate. The goal should be to induce an appropriate
level of monitoring within the organization.
Many laws and regulations-from the U.S. Attorneys' Manual to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines to the rules of several administrative agencies to the
corporation law of Delaware-encourage firms to establish compliance programs.1 68 Almost every publicly-traded corporation now appears to have one,
much to the benefit of lawyers' bank accounts. 169 Some people appear to have
forgotten that, although monitoring is a very good thing, an organization can have
too much of it. 170 For example, if a regime of monitoring and surveillance would
cost $500,000 but prevent criminal harms of only $100,000, the monitoring would
be wasteful. A threatened fine of $1 million for a $100,000 crime might induce a
corporation to implement this wasteful monitoring program.
Reluctant though I am to admit that economists can ever be right, some of them
do understand how best to calculate the fines of corporate offenders. 1 ' In most
cases, a court should assess the harm produced by the corporation's criminal act
and then make a judgment about how often this sort of criminal act is detected. It
should multiply the harm produced times the ex ante chance that the crime would
go undetected and then add a few dollars to tilt the balance in favor of law
observance. For example, if the offense has produced $1 million in harm and the
court's judgment is that only one of every four similar offenses is likely to be
punished, the fine might be $4,010,000. This sort of fine would assure that crime
would not pay but would not require
corporations to spend more to prevent crime
172
than the crime is likely to cost.
A court should then subtract from the fine any civil damages the corporation has
paid or can reasonably be expected to pay as a result of its crime. If $500,000 in
criminal fines would induce appropriate monitoring, requiring the corporation to
pay $500,000 in fines and then $500,000 in civil damages could induce excessive
monitoring.
168. See KRAwIEc, supra note 150, at 584-91.
169. Kimberly Krawiec observes that "powerful interest groups have a stake in and benefit from compliancebased liability regimes, particularly legal compliance professionals such as lawyers, compliance and ethics
consultants, in-house compliance and human resources personnel, and diversity trainers." Id. at 574-75. She adds
that "legal compliance professionals have been at the forefront of the push to adopt internal compliance structures,
sometimes overstating to a significant degree both the risks of a failure to adopt such structures and the benefits of
having such structures in place." Id. at 611. Although "the tendency of legal compliance professionals to overstate
both a new legal risk and their ability to contain that risk though internal compliance structures has been well
documented ... business organizations [have adopted] the legal compliance professionals' recommendations."
Id. at 611-612 (citations omitted).
170. See supratext accompanying notes 145-51.
171. The analysis that follows is drawn primarily from Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, CorporateCrime,
25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 321-22 (1996). For a different economic perspective, see ARLEN & KRAAKmAN, supra note
102.
172. The suitability of this formula is unaffected by whether courts recognize appropriate monitoring as a
defense. The formula's sanctions should induce firms to implement appropriate compliance programs whether or
not the defense is recognized.
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Other economic issues are debatable. When a corporation's gain from crime
exceeds the victims' loss, should the fine require the corporation to disgorge this
gain? Many economists would say no, 1 7 3 but I think the answer is yes. The
corporation's shareholders may be innocent, but they should not profit from a
crime committed on their behalf. Courts should not encourage crime even when,
from the vantage point of economists, this crime is efficient. 174
Should the fine be reduced when it may cause the corporation to fail and
innocent employees to lose their jobs? Like the economists, I think the answer is
no. If a company can achieve financial success only by committing crimes, it ought
to fail, and its employees ought to seek work elsewhere. Similarly, if an appropriate level of monitoring, to prevent the commission of crimes would cause
a
175
company to fail, it should fail, and its employees should seek work elsewhere.
Use of the proposed formula is not appropriate in every case, and even when
appropriate, it is unlikely to give judges a clear, practical yardstick for sentencing.
When a corporation's act has been made criminal for reasons other than the
economic harm it produces, the formula offers no help. It also offers little help
when the anticipated harm is uncertain, diffuse, and long-term.
Consider, for example, a corporate officer who has violated the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act 176 by bribing a foreign official to approve a highly beneficial project.
In the short run, the officer's bribery might have done more good than harm. Still,
the officer should be punished as a criminal, and the fact that his bribery was likely
to accomplish good things should not reduce his sentence. If the officer's corporate
employer did not appropriately discourage his conduct, the employer should be
subject to sanctions as well (preferably civil sanctions). Over the course of many
decisions, an honest foreign official will serve his country better than a corrupt
one, but no one can put a dollar value on this benefit. Similarly, the harm that
bribery by an American business may cause to peoples' perception of America

173. See, e.g., Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties,Criminal Law and the Control of CorporateBehavior, 71
B.U.L. REv. 395 (1991); Jennifer H. Arlen, Why the Commission's Proposal is Not Good Economics, 3 FED.
SENT'G REP. 138 (1990); Jeffrey S. Parker, The CurrentCorporateSentencing Proposals:History and Critique,3
FED. SETr'G REP. 133, 135 (1990). Compare Fisc-aL & SYKEs, supra note 171, at 345 (arguing that sanctions
based on the offender's gain rather than the victim's loss over-deter), with A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
Punitive Damages: An EconomicAnalysis, 111 HARv.L. REv. 869,918 (1998) ("[S]etting damages equal to harm
generally results in proper deterrence even when the harm is less than the defendant's gain; a policy of removing
the defendant's gain may result in over deterrence. An exception arises, however, when the defendant's gain is
socially illicit, in which case extracting the defendant's gain is desirable.").
174. Although I have argued that the existence of an appropriate compliance program should provide a defense
to criminal liability, the existence of such a program should not relieve a corporation of its obligation to
compensate the victims of crimes committed by its agents on its behalf. Similarly, a compliance program should
not relieve a corporation of a duty (preferably a civil duty) to disgorge any profit it has gained from the criminal
activities of its agents.
175. The loss of innocent workers' jobs remains a horrid feature of liability regimes in which penalties go
beyond the proposed fines-as they usually do when a loss of business licenses and other collateral consequences
render conviction a defacto death sentence for a corporation.
176. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1-3 (2006).
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cannot be calculated. A court might presume that the economic damage caused by
the bribe equaled the amount of the bribe, for the corporate officer presumably
would have been willing to reduce his price or otherwise use these funds to benefit
the public in order to gain the consideration he received from the corrupt official.
Looking only to the amount of the bribe, however, would likely to underestimate
substantially the long-term harm.
In other cases, a court may be able to calculate the economic harm caused by a
crime with reasonable precision, but even when it can, it may be unable to offer
more than a blind guess about the frequency with 'which this sort of crime is
detected.
Sometimes, to be sure, more than a blind guess may be possible. Daniel Fischel
and Alan Sykes note, for example, that the odds of detecting a major oil spill are
one hundred percent. In this sort of case, they say, the fine should simply equal the
harm.' 1 Yet even in this sort of case, the formula may not help much. Harm means
more than provable economic damages. In view of the lasting environmental harm
produced by an oil spill, an oil company should be encouraged to spend much
more to prevent the spill than simply the cost of cleaning it up and compensating
the people who can prove damages. In many situations, assessing the total cost of
crime-including the psychological trauma it produces and a share of the salaries
of the police officers, prosecutors, and judges who bring offenders to justice-is
impossible.
The point of the economist's formula is just to suggest a general approach.
Judges should view the punishment of corporations as King Edgar the Peaceful
would have if he had attended the University of Chicago. They should not attribute
intentionality and blame to an artificial person, and they should not try to make this
imaginary person suffer.
CONCLUSION

The reasons offered for punishing corporations as criminals are expressive and
instrumental. The expressive reasons match those that once might have been
offered to justify the punishment of animals and inanimate objects that produced
harm (deodand). The instrumental reasons match those that once might have been
offered to justify punishing all members of a group when one member eluded
punishment for his crimes (frankpledge). Neither set of reasons is very good, but
the frankpledge set is better than the deodand set. Recognizing that the reasons for
punishing corporations are instrumental suggests a revision of the current standard
of corporate liability and also suggests an approach to corporate sentencing. The
expressive approach appears to dominate popular writing, but attributing blame to
a corporation is no more sensible than attributing blame to a dagger, a fountain
pen, a Chevrolet, or any other instrumentality of crime.

177. FTSCHEL & SYKEs, supranote 171, at 343-44.
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